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ABSTRACT 
Geography of the Family 
by Kai A. Konrad, Harald Künemund, Kjell Erik Lommerud and Julio R. Robledo* 
We study the residential choice of siblings who are altruistic towards their parents. The 
first-born child’s location choice influences the behavior of the second-born child and 
can shift some of the burden of providing care for the parents from one child to the 
other. These strategic considerations lead to an equilibrium location pattern with first-
born children locating further away from their parents than second-born children. We 
also analyze the location choices empirically using German data. These data confirm 
our theoretical predictions. 
 
Keywords: Family public goods, voluntary intergenerational transfers 
JEL classification: H41, J10 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Geographie der Familie  
Wir untersuchen die Wohnortwahl von Geschwisterkindern, die altruistisch gegenüber 
ihren Eltern sind. Ältere Geschwister können durch ihre Wohnortwahl die Wohnortwahl 
ihrer jüngeren Geschwister beeinflussen und damit die mögliche Last der Pflege der 
alternden Eltern auf die jüngeren Geschwister verlagern. Diese strategischen 
Überlegungen führen im Gleichgewicht zu einem bestimmten Verhaltensmuster, was 
die Wohnortentscheidungen von Kindern im Verhältnis zu ihren Eltern angeht, einer 
„Geographie der Familie“. Wir zeigen ferner, dass sich dieses Verhaltensmuster in den 
Wohnortentscheidungen einer repräsentativen Stichprobe deutscher Haushalte 
widerspiegelt. 
                                                 
*  We thank Shelly Lundberg, Martin Rein, seminar participants, and two anonymous referees for 
valuable discussion and comments. The authors are responsible for all opinions expressed in this paper 
and for all remaining errors. 
1 Introduction
In many families, when parents grow old, the problem of taking care of
the elderly emerges. Children often like their parents and they like to visit
them. However, parents' desire for children's visits typically exceeds the
children's desire to visit them. Vern L. Bengtson and Joseph A. Kuypers
(1971), for instance, report that children loosen the ties with their parents
when they grow older, while the latter try to hang on to their children as long
as possible.
1
Suppose children are altruistic with respect to their parents.
They feel good if they know their parents are well treated and well taken
care of. However, because of this altruism, a serious public good problem
emerges if parents have more than one child. If two children, A and B, pay
attention to their parents and visit them, each is happy if the parents get a
lot of attention and a large number of visits. However, the increase in child
A's utility from a marginal additional unit of attention is larger if child B
rather than child A pays this attention.
The costs of providing attention and care for the parents are important
determinants for the amount of care which each child chooses to contribute.
A child, say B, is likely to provide little if its cost is high. Moreover, if
the other child B knows that child A provides little, in the equilibrium this
will induce B to provide more. Accordingly, prior to the actual voluntary
contributions, children have an incentive to change their own cost of making
contributions.
2
Distance between a sibling's residence and the location where
1
B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers (1985) consider
family visits or `contact' with parents as burdensome, at least at the margin. Donald Cox
and Mark R. Rank (1992) treat intergenerational transfers as an exchange between parents
and their children, and hence make a similar assumption. Laurence J. Kotliko and John
N. Morris (1989: 168) assume that parents bribe their children to elicit more attention.
2
The implications of relative contribution cost in games of voluntary contributions to
a public good has been highlighted, e.g., in Theodore C. Bergstrom (1989).
1
his or her parents live is crucial for the actual cost of providing care for the
parents or for visiting them.
Children make the choice of residence many years before the problem of
care giving becomes relevant. They could consider moving to their parents
when these are old and need care. However, we expect that most often the
cost of such a move is prohibitive. Children build up a social network of
friends in their local area, depending on their type of work, they establish
local business links that tie them to the area, and they may have children
themselves who have their own friends and ties, for instance, at school.
3
Job seniority has a positive and signicant income eect, e. g. due to job-
specic human capital accumulation. This is well documented, for instance,
for the U.S. by Robert E. Topel (1991). The income loss associated with a
job change reduces job mobility and thus the workers' geographical mobility.
Wim Groot and Maartje Verberne (1997) report that job mobility decreases
with age up to the age of 55, with most of the lifetime mobility occuring early
during working life (p. 380).
4
Hence, the children's choice of residence at the
time when they enter their professional life determines their future cost of
contributions in the care-giving game that is played many years later. This
makes the choice of residence a strategic variable.
5
In this paper we study the strategic incentives of siblings for choosing
residence (sections 2 to 4). Reasonable restrictions on preferences yield a
3
This may be even more true for European societies, compared to the more mobile
American society: in low-mobility societies few people migrate, and hence, few people
have an interest in making new acquaintances and this further raises the cost for those
who actually move.
4
For a survey on migration patterns and the determinants of migration see Michael J.
Greenwood (1997).
5
For justication of non-cooperative behavior in families, particularly for strategic
choices that yield commitment, see Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak (1993) and Kai A.
Konrad and Kjell Erik Lommerud (1995). For a survey on family economics see Theodore
C. Bergstrom (1993).
2
full characterization of all subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies. In
one set of equilibria, the older child moves suÆciently far away to induce
the younger child to locate next to the parents, even though this implies
that the younger child will provide all care in the later contribution game.
We allow for parents deciding whether they move closer to their children
when they are old and need care. Such a move has considerable cost, and
the equilibrium outcome will depend on the size of this cost. We confront
the theoretical results with empirical evidence in section 5. The theoretical
analysis predicts that, on average, a child with a younger sibling locates
further away from its parents than an only child or a child without a younger
sibling.
A large literature exists on intra-family resource allocation, and much is
known by now about the factors determining actual intra-family transfers
of money and services.
6
This paper is related to this literature but is not
a contribution to it. We are interested in the determinants of family mem-
bers' choice of residence with respect to each other, not in their transfers.
7
Children know that location with respect to their parents will be an impor-
tant determinant of their as well as their siblings' actual transfers in the
future, and they could try to make a strategic location choice, anticipating
and inuencing what these transfers will be in the future. Whether children
make such far sighted strategic decisions to try and aect the outcome of
games that are played between them and their siblings decades later is the
central question of this paper. We concentrate on one strategic action that
is made by all children: their choice of residence. This yields a `geography
6
For a survey see Beth J. Soldo and Martha S. Hill (1993), and for key survey references
see Joseph G. Altonji, Fumio Hayashi and Kotliko (1995, 1996), Kenneth A. Couch, Mary
C. Daly and Douglas A. Wolf (1999), Kotliko (1992), Kotliko and Morris (1989), and,
for Germany, Martin Kohli, Harald Kunemund, Andreas Motel and Marc Szydlik (2000).
7
We will concentrate on transfers of services. However, we will discuss why taking
money transfers into account would not change our results qualitatively.
3
of the family': theoretical evidence that explains location choice, and empir-
ical evidence that shows that location choice is in line with the theoretical
predictions, and may be guided by far sighted strategic behavior.
2 The model family
Consider the following family that consists of parents P , and two children,
A(dam) who is born rst, and B(enjamin), who is born later. Parents P
live and raise their children at some place, that is normalized to 0. When A
and B are about eighteen to thirty years old, they make a location choice.
The choices are points a and b. These locations can be interpreted as points
in the two-dimensional plane or on the real line, as only distance matters
here. We assume that Adam chooses his location a rst. Empirically, this
should be true in the majority of cases, because Adam is older. His choice
constitutes stage 1 of a game with four stages. At stage 2 Benjamin
chooses his location b. The children stay in these places. For professional or
social reasons discussed in the introduction, we assume that moving becomes
prohibitively costly for them.
Years after the children have made their choices of residence, their parents
retire and may need attention. Parents may consider moving closer to their
children. In many cases these costs are also prohibitive for parents. However,
at the time when parents enter retirement age, their cost of moving may
be much lower for them than for children who are in the midst of their
professional life and may have dependent children.
8
Also the amount of care
parents receive is a more important factor in parents' utility than it is for
the children. This makes it reasonable to disregard the possibility of children
moving at this stage, but to consider the possibility of a move by parents
8
Greenwood (1997, 705n) surveys evidence according to which migration occurs fre-
quently in connection with a change in life-cycle circumstances.
4
more explicitly. Parents choose whether to move at stage 3. They have
a cost (e.g., loss of social contacts) equal to K only if they move, and we
assume that this cost is independent of the distance by which they move.
9
The parents' place of residence at the end of stage 3 is p, with p = 0 (and
no cost) if parents do not move. Denote the distance between two points x
and y by Æ(x; y): The distances between P and A and P and B are nally
determined at the end of stage 3 as functions of a, b, and of the parents'
nal location p, and denoted by Æ
A
= Æ(a; p) and Æ
B
= Æ(b; p).
Parents care about their cost of moving, and about the number of visits
(`care units') they receive from their children. The number of visits will
depend on the locations of parents and children. Let G be the total number
of visits that parents receive. Their objective function is assumed to be
U
P
= w(G)  (p). (1)
Here w(G) is a twice dierentiable, monotonically increasing and strictly
concave function, and (p) = K if p 6= 0 (i.e., if parents move), and (p) = 0
if p = 0 (i.e., if parents do not move).
Finally, at stage 4, A and B decide simultaneously about the number
of visits, g
A
and g
B
.
10
Each visit involves a cost. The time cost per visit
consists of one unit of time actually spent with the parents, plus travel time
that, by appropriate normalization, is equal to the actual distance Æ
i
between
child i's place of residence and the parents' place. Accordingly, child i's time
budget m is allocated between activities x
i
that yield private consumption,
9
A permanent change of location involves several costs. A major share of these costs is
independent of the distance between the past and the future locations, making the binary
cost assumption here a good approximation that simplies the exposition. In the end of
section 4 we discuss why our results generalize to a location dependent cost function.
10
Stage 4 has many periods in reality, allowing perhaps for some cooperation between
siblings. We focus on the non-cooperative outcome at stage 4, and discuss possible
cooperation at stage 4 at the end of section 4.
5
and family visits:
m = x
i
+ (1 + Æ
i
)g
i
for i 2 fA;Bg: (2)
When making their simultaneous choices about the number of visits at stage
4, i cares about his private consumption x
i
, and about the total number
G = g
A
+ g
B
(3)
of family visits that his parents get:
U
i
(x
i
; G) = x
i
+ u(G); for i = A;B. (4)
Utility (4) parallels the standard preferences with one private and one public
good, where the public good is the total sum of the visits. To concentrate
on interior solutions, we assume throughout the paper that u
0
> 0; u
00
< 0,
u
0
(m) < 1 and lim
G!0
u
0
(G) =1.
We disregard the possibility that children may derive additional private
utility from their own contributions as in impure altruism models like those
in James Andreoni (1989, 1990). Utility (4) is quasi-linear, increasing in both
arguments, and strictly concave in aggregate contributions. By these simpli-
cations we avoid letting cross eects or income eects cloud the strategic
incentive on which we focus. Our qualitative results generalize to a broader
class of preferences. We will discuss this further in section 4. Before we solve
this game we consider the situation with an only child.
3 An only child
An only child S(arah) has no brother or sister who could contribute to par-
ents' visits. Suppose S is located in s and parents are located in p. Sarah
maximizes utility for given distance Æ
S
= Æ(s; p) by a choice of g
S
= G that
maximizes (4) subject to (2). We call this amount stand-alone contribution.
6
By our assumptions about u, an interior equilibrium exists and is determined
by 1 + Æ
S
= u
0
(G) and g
S
= G.
At stage 1 S chooses a location s. The parents stay at 0 or, if they
move, they move to s. In any case, a choice s = 0, which induces p = 0,
maximizes her payo. Hence, our model predicts that { in the absence of
further motives { an only child has an incentive to live as close as possible
to his or her parents.
There are many other reasons aecting children's choice of residence that
are exogenous to the analysis here, and may induce the child to choose a
residence at some distance, for instance, particular job opportunities or emo-
tional attachment to a particular region. Hence, we would not expect that all
only children live with their parents in the same household or house. How-
ever, the analysis will show that siblings have a strategic reason to move
away from their parents which an only child does not have. An only child
cannot expect that anyone else will compensate for the lack of own attention
to his or her parents. This will be dierent if parents have more than one
child.
4 Siblings
Consider now the game with two children, A and B. To characterize the
equilibrium we dene
^
Æ  minfÆ
A
; Æ
B
g (5)
the shorter of the distances between parents and their children. Further, we
dene (Æ) the amount G of contributions that solves
u
0
(G) = 1 + Æ: (6)
Note that (Æ) is strictly decreasing in Æ.
7
Lemma 1 The contribution equilibrium of stage 4 is characterized by ag-
gregate contributions g
A
+ g
B
= (
^
Æ): If
^
Æ = Æ
i
< Æ
j
, then g
i
= (
^
Æ)
and g
j
= 0, for i; j 2 fA;Bg: If
^
Æ = Æ
A
= Æ
B
, any g
A
= (
^
Æ) and
g
B
= (1  )(
^
Æ) with 0    1 is a contribution equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix. Due to the absence of income eects for (4),
the aggregate contributions G in the equilibrium for given location choices
a; b and p are characterized by (6). The contribution equals the stand-alone
contribution of the child who lives closest to the parents. Hence, it is a func-
tion (
^
Æ) of this minimum distance
^
Æ. The full amount (
^
Æ) is contributed by
the one child who lives closer to the parents. The other child contributes zero.
If both children live at the same distance from their parents, the aggregate
contributions (
^
Æ) are also uniquely determined, but any pair of contribu-
tions that sums up to this amount is an equilibrium. The non-negative shares
contributed by A and B in the equilibrium if both children locate at the same
distance from their parents are denoted  and (1  ).
Next we dene a critical distance for parents' choice to move. Parents
anticipate that the care they receive is G = (
^
Æ). They can inuence this
distance for given location choices a and b by their choice of whether to move.
If parents move they can locate anywhere. But from Lemma 1 they choose
p 2 fa; bg because only these locations yield
^
Æ = 0 and maximize the care
they receive. Let Æ(K) be the distance for which
w((0))  w((Æ(K))) = K: (7)
This distance can be used to characterize the parents' decision at stage 3.
Parents are indierent between p = 0 and p 2 fa; bg if minfÆ(a; 0); Æ(b; 0)g =
Æ(K). They do not move (i.e., choose p = 0) if minfÆ(a; 0); Æ(b; 0)g < Æ(K),
because the cost K of moving would exceed the parents' benet from in-
creased care. They move to p 2 fa; bg if minfÆ(a; 0); Æ(b; 0)g > Æ(K). We
denote 
A
and 
B
the conditional probabilities for moving to a or b respec-
8
tively. In general, these probabilities can be functions 
A
(a; b) and 
B
(a; b) of
a and b. The conditional probability 
B
will be important for characterizing
the set of subgame perfect equilibria.
Turning to stage 2, we dene a distance that is critical for B's location
choice. Let Æ
crit
be the distance for which
u((0)) +m  (0) = u((Æ
crit
)) +m: (8)
Consider the situation when Æ
crit
< Æ(K). B anticipates that his parents will
not move at stage 3. Thus, B has two relevant alternatives. First, B can
choose some b with Æ(b; 0) > Æ(a; 0). A will be the only contributor to the
public good and B earns utility equal to u((Æ(a; 0))) +m. Second, B can
decide to locate closer to their parents than Æ(a; 0), thus becoming the only
contributor. In this second alternative, B would prefer to locate as close as
possible to his parents and earn the utility on the left-hand side of (8).
B's choice of distance depends on A's location choice. Therefore, we
need to distinguish between three cases, namely whether Æ(a; 0) is equal to,
smaller or greater than Æ
crit
. If Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
, B is indierent between these
alternatives. If Æ(a; 0) < Æ
crit
, B prefers to choose some b with Æ(b; 0) > Æ(a; 0)
such that only A makes contributions to G. Finally, if Æ(a; 0) > Æ
crit
, then
child B strictly prefers to stay next to their parents. Note that for these
considerations Æ
crit
< Æ(K) was crucial.
The discussion about the critical distance Æ
crit
shows that A's choice of
location is strategic. By his choice of distance, A can induce B to stay close
to their parents and to assume the whole burden of making contributions.
Proposition 1 Let Æ
crit
< Æ(K). (i) If  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1], the set of
subgame perfect equilibrium location choices of A is fa jÆ(a; 0)  Æ
crit
g:
(ii) If  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1), then the set of subgame perfect equilibria is
described by (a; b; p) with Æ(a; 0) 2 [Æ
crit
; Æ(K)], b = 0 and p = 0.
9
A formal proof is in the appendix. The equilibria described in part (ii)
of Proposition 1 have a simple intuition. Suppose, e.g., K = 1; that is,
regardless of children's location choices, parents never relocate. Consider
A's choice of location. A knows that B's choice will depend on A's choice as
described by the critical distance in (8). B can always induce A to become the
only contributor by locating further away than A. But if A locates far away
from their parents and B locates even further away, B will not contribute,
but A will contribute very little. If A locates suÆciently far away from their
parents, as the sole contributor he would contribute so little that B is better
o by locating close to the parents even though this implies that B becomes
the sole contributor. A will always generate this outcome, because he gets the
maximum contribution level G = (0) without having to contribute himself.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 reveals that the set of equilibrium locations is
larger than the set described in (ii) if we allow for all tie-breaking rules, that
is, even some tie-breaking rules that are extreme in some sense. For instance,
suppose parents always move to B if they move, and B is the sole contributor
if Æ
A
= Æ
B
. Formally, this is described by tie-breaking rules 
B
= 1 and  = 0.
In this case A has a few other location choices that generate maximum utility
to him. For instance, a = b = p with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K), and (a; b; p) with
Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K) and b = p = 0 become subgame perfect equilibria.
Let us now consider the situation when Æ
crit
> Æ(K). Here, the strategic
eect of distance by which A can induce B to move to b = 0 does not work.
If A moves suÆciently far away in trying to induce B to become the only
contributor, B now has a dierent option: B also moves far away and waits
for the parents' decision to move next to one of them, which also leads to
total care equal to (0), but reduces the probability that B has to contribute
this amount. In the equilibrium both children locate far away. Parents then,
by their move to one of them, decide who is going to contribute (0). More
specically:
10
Proposition 2 Let Æ
crit
> Æ(K). If 0 <  < 1 and 0 < 
B
< 1 then
the set of subgame perfect location equilibria is described by (a; b; p) with
Æ(a; 0)  Æ(K), Æ(b; 0)  Æ(K), and p 2 fa; bg.
The equilibrium results are qualitatively robust with respect to several
directions of generalization. First, the result about the structure of equi-
librium location choices of children generalizes to a larger subset of utility
functions U(x
i
; G) for which the income eect is not too strong. (The precise
characterization of this subset is not straightforward and space consuming).
Second, the result generalizes to some contribution technologies other
than the one in equation (3). For instance, indivisibilities or increasing re-
turns may make it desirable for all care to be provided by one of the siblings.
In the theoretical analysis we assumed that total care is the sum of chil-
dren's contributions, but we ended up with a corner solution in which one
child contributes the full amount. Including indivisibilities in the theoreti-
cal analysis increases the strategic incentives to move away. Indivisibilities
can even extend the corner solution outcome to a broader class of children's
utility functions.
Third, children may make their location choices simultaneously instead
of sequentially. This may be the case if commitment does not result from
the choice of residence itself, but from living in some place for many years.
Therefore the strategic situation at stages 1 and 2 may collapse into one
single stage and may be appropriately described by a simultaneous choice of
locations. As is shown in the appendix:
Proposition 3 The sequential location choices (a; b; p) described in Propo-
sition 1 are also equilibrium location choices if children choose their locations
simultaneously.
Fourth, the children may dier in their preferences. Only if A's marginal
utility of contributions considerably exceeds that of B, may this force A
11
into an equilibrium choice a = 0, with A becoming the only contributor in
this case, with b arbitrary. If A's and B's preferences dier only slightly,
or if B's marginal utility of contributions exceeds that of A, Proposition 1
generalizes in a straightforward way. Note that in this case Æ
crit
is smaller
the higher B's valuation of contributions. For instance, if male and female
children value contributions dierently, we should expect children's sex and
the combination of sexes to be important. We will discuss this more closely
when presenting the empirical results.
Fifth, while preemption by location choice may be described well by non-
cooperative behavior, the children may play cooperatively in the care-giving
stage. The eÆcient number of visits is denoted  (
^
Æ) and is determined by
the condition
2u
0
( (
^
Æ)) = 1 +
^
Æ: (9)
If A and B Nash bargain and have transferable utility, this amount   is
provided by the child who is located closer to the parents. If they have equal
bargaining power, this child receives a side payment from the other child that
is equivalent to
1
2
( (
^
Æ)  (
^
Æ))(1 +
^
Æ) and enjoys utility U
c
(
^
Æ) with
U
c
(Æ) = u( (Æ)) +m  (Æ)(1 + Æ) 
1
2
[ (Æ)  (Æ)](1 + Æ); (10)
where the superscript c denotes the cooperation in the care-giving stage.
This utility depends on Æ. A decrease in Æ reduces provision cost, which,
for a given transfer, increases U
c
. However, a decrease in Æ also changes the
transfer. Depending on Æ and ( 
0
(Æ)   
0
(Æ)), the transfer may increase or
decrease in Æ. Analogously to (8), let 
crit
be dened by as the solution to
U
c
(0) = u( (
crit
)) +m 
1
2
(1 + 
crit
)[ (
crit
)  (
crit
)]. (11)
Further, let (K) be the critical distance that makes parents indierent
between staying at 0 or moving to A or to B. This distance is determined
12
analogously to (7) by the solution to
w( (0))  w( ((K))) = K: (12)
Consideration is straightforward if maxfU
c
(Æ)g = U
c
(0), and we concentrate
on this case here.
Proposition 4 Suppose the outcome in stage 4 is characterized by sym-
metric Nash bargaining with side payments. Let 
crit
< (K), and let
U
c
(Æ) in (10) take its maximum at Æ = 0 for all Æ. If 0 <  < 1 and
0 < 
B
< 1, then the set of subgame perfect equilibria is described by (a; b; p)
with Æ(a; 0) 2 [
crit
;(K)], b = 0 and p = 0.
Proposition 4 generalizes the main Proposition 1 for the case with a co-
operative care-giving stage. The relevant distances Æ
crit
and Æ(K) change to

crit
and (K), but the nature of the equilibrium does not change.
Sixth, we assumed that the cost to parents if they relocate is independent
of the distance between their old and their new location. These costs dier
in nature from children's cost of visits. Unlike with children's unit cost
of visits, for relocation actual travel time to the new place of residence is
unimportant. The cost could nevertheless be an increasing function (Æ(0; p))
of the distance, consisting of some xed cost K plus some cost that depends
on Æ(0; p) with 
0
(Æ) > 0, for instance because parents may be able to sustain
a larger share of their social network after a move if the distance Æ(0; p) is
smaller. It is then not clear whether parents who move move right next to one
of their children. This changes the utility levels for children in subgames in
which parents move. Also Æ(K) is determined by variations of the conditions
(7) and (8). However, the incentives for preemptive behavior by A and the
resulting structure of equilibria remain qualitatively the same.
Seventh, we did not consider monetary gifts from children to parents.
For Germany, Kohli et al. (2000) show that there are very few monetary
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transfers from children to parents.
11
Parents are nancially independent due
to generous old-age social security programs, making sickness care perhaps
less important than the emotional benets from children's visits, and for
this type of care, monetary transfers are not a substitute. From a theory
point of view, monetary altruistic transfers do not alter any of the results if
they enter additively separably.
12
The strategic incentives are even stronger
if giving of money and time are complements, but weaken if they are very
strong substitutes. Couch et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence that time,
gifts and money may even be complements.
The following conjecture summarizes some hypotheses regarding the em-
pirical results:
Conjecture 1 Adams dier signicantly from Benjamins (and from only
children) in their location pattern. Adams locate further away from their
parents than Benjamins, particularly in families in which parents have not
moved after the children have left home.
5 Empirical evidence
We test our theory using the data set from the German Aging Survey. This
is a large representative survey of 40-85 year old German nationals living in
private households, collected in the rst half of 1996. The sample (n = 4838)
is stratied by age groups, sex, and location in East and West Germany. The
survey is designed as a rst wave of a panel study and comprises economic and
sociological criteria of the various dimensions of life situations and welfare as
11
Similar results are reported for the US by Soldo and Hill (1993). Time transfers from
children to elderly parents are much more likely than nancial transfers.
12
Quasi-linearity of utility is important for this result. For more general preferences,
monetary transfers can have income eects that may weaken or strengthen the incentives
for visits, even if monetary transfers enter utility additively separably.
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well as psychological measures of self and life concepts.
13
We restrict our attention to parents with one and two biological children
who are still alive. The reason for this restriction is that we have developed a
theory about the location choice of families with exactly two children. Also,
this restriction avoids a possible endogeneity problem caused by possible
parental preferences for children. We further require that all children are
30 years of age or older. The rationale for this requirement is the assump-
tion that children of this age have had the chance to leave their parents'
household, e.g. that existing coresidence is a result of a decision as discussed
above. Finally, we disregard families where the parents have moved after
both children have moved out. Thus, we focus on families where the strate-
gic equilibrium is characterized by Proposition 1 and/or Proposition 4. If
parents move (e.g. when Æ(K) > Æ
crit
), the strategic eect for rst-born chil-
dren vanishes. Using this subgroup, we have 1993 observations, 625 families
with an only child and 684 families with two children.
The key variable of our analysis is the distance D
i
between the parents'
and child i's place of residence. Our data set provides information whether a
particular child lives in the same house or household as the parents (D
i
 0),
in the neighborhood (D
i
 1), in the same urban community (D
i
 2), in
a dierent community, but less than 2 hours travel time away (D
i
 3), or
further away (D
i
 4).
13
The German Aging Survey has been designed and analyzed jointly by the Research
Group on Aging and the Life Course at the Free University of Berlin (Germany) and
the Research Group on Psychogerontology at the University of Nijmegen (Netherlands) in
collaboration with infas Sozialforschung (Bonn, Germany) and nanced by the German
Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women and Youth. For the questionnaire and
additional information see the website of the Research Group on Aging and the Life Course
at http://www.fall-berlin.de/. The dataset is available to researchers at the Central
Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne (Study No. 3264). A
comprehensive report of the sociological results is given by Kohli and Kunemund (2000).
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Our aim is to analyze whether the existence of a younger brother or sister
aects children's choice of proximity to the parents. Our main hypothesis
is that Adams have a higher probability of being in a higher distance cat-
egory. Note that our theory rests on the assumption that location choice
predetermines care decisions at a later stage when care is actually needed.
We do not consider whether Adams provide more or less care. However, our
theoretical argument is that Adams move away in order to reduce their ex-
pected contributions to care. This is true if Adam can expect to spend less
care if he moves further away than his brother. We cannot measure a child's
expectations directly, but rely on the extremely close empirical correlation
between distance and care (for instance, Cox and Rank (1992) proxy actual
care with distance).
Simple descriptive statistics suggest a systematic dierence in behavior
between only children and children with a younger sibling regarding their
residence choice. Figure 5 shows graphically how Adams locate less often
near the parents and more often further away. The black, left column denotes
the proportion of Adams locating at that distance. The middle, grey column
stands for the Benjamin and the right, white column represents the only
children. Consider the rst distance category \same house or household".
Only 11% of all Adams live in the same house or household as their parents,
while 17% of all Benjamins and 19% of all only children do. In the higher
distance categories, the proportion of Adams living further away increases
compared both to Benjamins and only children. In the furthest distance
category, more than two hours travel time away from the parents, we nd
19% of all Adams, 16% of all Benjamins and 15% of all only children.
We carried out independence tests between the child type and the distance
category. The Pearson statistic 
2
= 23:45 and the likelihood-ratio statistic
LR = 24:16 lead to a clear rejection of the null hypothesis that the child type
and the distance category are statistically independent (both with 8 degrees
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of freedom, the p-value is 0.003 and 0.002, respectively).
But this dierent location behavior may be shaped by other factors con-
cerning both children and their parents, e.g. the rst-born child may obtain
a better education, which is usually associated with a higher geographic mo-
bility. Thus, we include several characteristics of children and parents in a
multivariate model. We estimate an ordered logistic model to verify that
Adams locate further away from the parents than Benjamins and only chil-
dren after controlling for the eects of other variables.
On the children's side, we include sex, marital status, and socio-economic
status in our analysis. Marital status is a dummy variable (1 for married
children, and 0 in all other cases). We expect married children to live further
away from their parents than non-married children because of their respective
spouses' choice of residence. The expected sign of sex is ambiguous because
there are several relevant eects. We consider this more closely below.
The data does not provide explicit information about the children's edu-
cation or their income, but it does provide detailed information about their
occupation. We therefore use the international socio-economic index of oc-
cupational status which was designed to attain maximal correlation between
occupation and both income and education (see Harry B. Ganzeboom, Paul
M. De Graaf and Donald J. Treiman (1992)). This index of socio-economic
status (SES) was recoded into a set of four dummy variables: No information
on occupation and therefore no information on socio-economic status, both
the bottom and top 40 percent of the scale values and nally the middle
group which serves as the reference group for socio-economic status.
As for the parents, we consider age, health status (three categories:
healthy, small and large disabilities), a dummy measuring the parents' mari-
tal status, and a dummy for the existence of grandchildren. Older parents and
parents with health disabilities require more care, and a single or widowed
parent may also need more attention than couple parents. If grandparents
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look after the grandchildren, this could be an incentive for their children to
locate near the grandparents. These four characteristics are known to be
very important for explaining actual care and intergenerational transfers in
goods and services. However, we would not expect them to contribute much
to explaining the children's strategic location decision, which usually takes
place years before care is needed. We also include a wealth dummy for the
parents which is 1 if the parents are wealthy and/or homeowners. Parents'
wealth is dierent from the other parental variables: when children make
their location choice, in many cases it is not diÆcult for them to anticipate
whether their parents will be wealthy a decade or two later. We will take
this up in Section 6.
The ordered logistic regression estimates the following equations for a
dependent variable with 5 distance categories:
ln

P (D
i
> j)
P (D
i
 j)

= 
j
+ 
0
k
X
k
; for j = 0; 1; 2; 3: (13)
The model estimates 4 \cut-o" points for D
i
and a single eect param-
eter 
k
for each independent variable X
k
. This eect of the independent
variables X
k
on the log odds is therefore the same for all distance categories.
The fraction on the left hand side is the logit, that is, the probability that
D
i
is greater than j versus smaller than or equal to j. When X
k
changes,
the change in the probablity that D
i
is in a higher category is the same for
all categories. The results are given in Table 1.
The central result conrms that rst-born Adams are 45% more likely to
locate in a higher distance category than only children. This result is highly
signicant, controlling for all the variables mentioned above, and is therefore
very strong evidence in line with our theoretical predictions. Benjamins'
location choices do not signicantly dier from that of only children, and
this is also in line with our theoretical results.
Our control variables are mostly not signicant, except for marital status
19
Table 1: Ordinal logistic regression for 3 child types,
n = 1709 valid observations
Variables 
k
Std.Err. p-value exp(
k
)
Sex 0.057 0.093 0.539 1.059
Marital Status 0.326 0.114 0.004 1:386

SES data missing 0.085 0.186 0.646 1.089
SES index below average -0.471 0.114 0.000 0:625

SES index above average 0.603 0.117 0.000 1:828

Age Parents -0.003 0.006 0.585 0.997
Marital Status Parents 0.061 0.106 0.562 1.063
Wealth Parents -0.086 0.104 0.406 0.917
Grandchildren -0.054 0.113 0.634 0.947
Health Parents Small Disab. -0.081 0.098 0.409 0.922
Health Parents Large Disab. 0.099 0.129 0.445 1.104
Adams 0.372 0.109 0.001 1:451

Benjamins 0.094 0.109 0.385 1.099

j
Coe. Std.Err. p-value

0
1.635 0.423 0.000

1
0.831 0.421 0.048

2
-0.289 0.420 0.491

3
-1.795 0.423 0.000
LR-test all slope coeÆcients = 0: 
2
= 96:483 (13 d.f.), p < 0:001
The reference categories for non scaled variables are male, non-married, average
SES, only child, married parents, poor parents, no grandchildren, no health prob-
lems. We denote signicance at the 5% and 10% level with ** and *, respectively.
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and socio-economic status. Married children locate further away compared to
unmarried children. Moreover, it is more likely that a child locates further
away if the socio-economic status is above average. Conversely, a socio-
economic status below average is associated with lower geographical mobility.
Children's sex is known to be an important and highly signicant explana-
tory variable for actual care giving. It is well-established that daughters give
more help than sons (e.g., Jerey W. Dwyer and Raymond T. Coward (1991),
and Nadine F. Marks (1996)). For the children's location decision, sex on
its own seems not be a determinant. These two facts are not contradictory.
Suppose daughters are more willing to provide care or have a comparative
productivity advantage in providing care. As discussed in Section 4, when
they make a strategic location choice, they may have an incentive to move
even further away than sons to commit credibly to not being the provider
of care, or they may be unable to use location choice to shift the burden
of provision of care to their younger brother or sister, because they had to
move away too far [i.e., Æ
crit
> Æ(K)], or because their younger brother would
provide too little care. Also, women participate less often in the labor force.
Accordingly, their costs of moving are often smaller. When new families are
founded, wives may move to their husbands more often than husbands to
their wives, which increases the distance of female children.
To examine this possibly dierential behavior of the various sex combina-
tions of siblings, we estimate an ordinal logistic regression in which, instead
of considering 3 types of children, we consider 9 types: only children (we do
not dierentiate with respect to their sex and use them as reference group),
Adams who have a younger brother (Benjamin), Adams who have a younger
sister (Betty), Alices with a younger brother (Benjamin), Alices who have a
younger sister (Betty), and the complementary combinations for the younger
siblings, Benjamin and Betty.
In Table 2 we report the results for this estimation: all A-siblings are
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Table 2: Ordinal logistic regression for 9 child types,
n = 1709 valid observations
Variables 
k
Std.Err. p-value exp(
k
)
Marital Status 0.329 0.114 0.004 1:390

SES data missing 0.093 0.186 0.618 1.097
SES index below average -0.449 0.112 0.000 0:638

SES index above average 0.630 0.118 0.000 1:877

Age Parents -0.003 0.006 0.627 0.997
Marital Status Parents 0.055 0.106 0.604 1.057
Wealth Parents -0.092 0.104 0.379 0.913
Grandchildren -0.066 0.113 0.560 0.936
Health Parents Small Disab. -0.076 0.098 0.440 0.927
Health Parents Large Disab. 0.091 0.129 0.483 1.095
Adam of Adam-Benjamin 0.334 0.174 0.055 1:397

Adam of Adam-Betty 0.322 0.164 0.049 1:380

Alice of Alice-Betty 0.391 0.175 0.026 1:478

Alice of Alice-Benjamin 0.446 0.159 0.005 1:562

Benjamin of Adam-Benjamin -0.190 0.177 0.282 0.827
Betty of Adam-Betty 0.196 0.164 0.231 1.217
Betty of Alice-Betty 0.239 0.175 0.173 1.270
Benjamin of Alice-Benjamin 0.112 0.162 0.490 1.119

j
Coe. Std.Err. p-value

0
1.641 0.421 0.000

1
0.835 0.418 0.046

2
-0.288 0.417 0.491

3
-1.795 0.421 0.000
LR-test all slope coeÆcients = 0: 
2
= 101:026 (18 d.f.), p < 0:001
The reference categories for non scaled variables are male, non-married, average
SES, only child, married parents, poor parents, no grandchildren, no health prob-
lems. We denote signicance at the 5% and 10% level with ** and *, respectively.
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more likely to locate further away than B-siblings or only children. Adam
and Alice are both more likely to locate in a higher distance category than
only children and the results are signicant at the 5% level. Doing pairwise
comparisons, daughthers move further away than sons. Consider Adam and
Alice with a younger Benjamin: while Adam's probability of locating in
a further distance category is 40% higher, for Alice it is 56%. For Adam
and Alice with a female sibling, the values are 38% and 48%, respectively.
However, these eects are small. Our main result regarding the older siblings'
locating further away is conrmed when we analyze the eect of dierent sex
combinations in more detail. We carried out several robustness tests that all
conrmed the asymmetry in siblings' behavior as predicted by Proposition
1, according to which the child with the opportunity to commit rst moves
further away.
14
6 Discussion
The results are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. How-
ever, we would like to discuss a few possible complications and alternative
explanations for the observed location pattern.
Reciprocity. We assume that care giving is a gift, motivated by altruism.
14
First, we replaced the variable \Adam" by the variable \child who moved out rst".
The two variables are highly correlated. First movers were Adams in 79% of the cases
and they move signicantly further away than the child leaving the parents after his
sibling. Second, we compared the behavior of Adams and Benjamins without including
only children. Adams are more likely to move further away than Benjamins, and the eect
is highly signicant. Third, we considered possible interactions of the child type with the
age dierence of the siblings and with parental age. A large age dierence between the
siblings increases the asymmetry between Adams and Benjamins. Regarding parental
age, Adams are again signicantly more likely to move further away than Benjamins, and
Adams of older parents move slightly further away than Adams of younger parents.
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However, in some families, care giving may instead be the outcome of reci-
procity.
15
In case of reciprocity, anticipated money transfers and mutually
benecial exchange between parents and their children could induce children
to locate closer to the parents. But reciprocity does not explain why the
rst-born child behaves systematically dierently from his or her sibling.
EÆcient negotiations. Suppose that Adams and Benjamins negotiate
eÆciently before they make their location choices and write a complete con-
tract about care giving and side payments in the far future that takes into
account all contingencies. This is a theoretical possibility, and may also ex-
plain asymmetric location choices of siblings. However, this cannot explain
why there is a signicant bias for Adams being more likely to locate far away
more frequently than Benjamins. Also, this bias cannot be attributed to dif-
ferent family roles of Adams and Benjamins, with Adams receiving a better
education than Benjamins, because our estimation controls for factors like
education and income with the SES-variable.
Parents-in-law. Our theoretical model and the estimations do not take
into account the fact that the actual strategic situation of children is some-
times more complex, because a child's possible marriage generates additional
care problems with respect to the child's parents-in-law and strategic interac-
tion between them and their brothers or sisters-in-law has to be considered.
On theoretical grounds, a large variety of somewhat similar complex strategic
situations had to be considered. We expect, however, that the basic quali-
tative result, according to which Adams typically have a strategic incentive
to move away, survives. The future in-law family ties are typically undeter-
mined at the stage when children make their location choice. Hence, they
15
This idea has a long tradition in sociology. See, e.g., Alvin W. Gouldner (1960). For
a detailed account on reciprocity see Kunemund and Rein (1999). Soldo and Hill (1993)
report in their survey that there is little evidence for reciprocity as the motivating force
in the transfers between parents and children.
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would not aect the location choices in a systematic way.
16
Instilled preferences. The number of children and parents' investment
behavior in terms of monetary transfers or instilling altruistic preferences may
be co-determined by parents' preferences for children. In order to control for
this, our empirical analysis concentrates on the dierences between siblings
in families with two children, not the dierences between only children and
children in families with more than one child. Of course, one cannot rule out
that Adams simply are instilled with preferences to move further away than
their younger brother. Note, however, that the dierential location pattern
of Adams and Benjamins cannot be attributed to observable dierences in,
e.g., education received, as we control for such eects.
Social norms. The empirical result according to which the rst- born
child has a higher probability of moving further away could also be explained
as a result of compliance with social norms. In former times, some societies
had developed strong norms about the roles of children in taking care of the
elderly parents. For instance, in Japan, it was customary for the parents to
live with the oldest son (see, e.g., Wataru Koyano et al. 1994). Such norms
may have been important to overcoming ineÆciencies that are generated by
the strategic considerations of location choice. To our knowledge, no such
general social norm exists in present Germany.
Strategic bequests. Finally we contrast our model and empirical results
with the model of strategic bequests. In the strategic bequests model of
Bernheim et al. (1985), parents design a contest for their children. They
make the bequest dependent on children's relative attention. The children's
choice of residence in such a model is also a strategic variable, but compared
to our model, the strategic incentives work in the opposite direction. Both
16
Of course, it would be nice to conrm this hypothesis, but, as discussed by Wolf (1994,
p. 155), there are almost no data available about family networks including the eects of
marriage and resulting parents, brothers, and sisters-in-law.
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children make contributions in the contest. The bequest is the prize and
is allocated according to a contest success function. The child who has the
lower cost of making contributions (that is, who lives closer to the parents)
has an advantage. As is well-known from contest theory, the contestant with
lower contribution cost earns a higher expected rent in the contest equilib-
rium (see, e.g., Shmuel Nitzan 1994). Accordingly, in the strategic bequest
model each child has a strategic incentive to locate as close as possible to
the parents. Therefore, consideration of the residence choice in the strategic
bequest model would not explain the asymmetric behavior of siblings. Also,
we expect that the strategic bequest motive is stronger if parents are rich.
This would explain if children locate closer to their parents if their parents
are rich. For Germany there is no such eect.
However, we cannot discriminate against the strategic bequests model.
First, only a subgroup of families may engage in a strategic bequests game,
whereas another group may play the strategic location game considered here.
Second, the strategic bequests story becomes more complex if the set of par-
ents' strategies is more sophisticated. For instance, parents could correct
the contest between their children and handicap the child that has a loca-
tion advantage. Also, the issue of collusion between siblings and the role
of distance choice for the possibility of collusion makes considerations more
involved. Third, higher income and social status is usually associated with
higher mobility. The resulting increase in distance might - on an aggregate
level - outweigh a possible proximity eect resulting from strategic bequests.
But none of these cases could explain the asymmetry between Adams and
Benjamins which we found in our data.
26
7 Conclusions
Much work has been done on the determinants of intergenerational transfers.
Our analysis does not contribute to this literature by identifying new or
dierent determinants, but we build on the work that has shown that there
is a close relationship between in-kind transfers from children to parents and
the distance between them. We focus on the role of location decisions as a
strategic commitment instrument.
In a theoretical analysis we showed that location choice has a strategic
commitment value if it is made before actual care giving occurs. The analysis
predicts some structural properties of the equilibrium location choices by the
children and their parents that yields a 'geography of the family'. Several
location patterns are possible, but one main pattern in families with two
children emerges. For this pattern, the older child Adam locates in some dis-
tance from his or her parents, essentially forcing the younger child Benjamin
into staying with the parents and providing the major share of care giving.
We then turned to the question whether individuals are suÆciently far
sighted and rational to make such strategic location choices. We test our
theoretical predictions with a set of data on elderly households. Our ma-
jor nding shows that, controlling for all socio-economic variables available,
Adams are more likely to locate further away from parents than Benjamins.
This nding proves to be very robust. We consider this asymmetric behavior
of siblings as evidence that is in line with the theoretical results, suggesting
that a signicant share of siblings indeed acts far-sightedly and strategically
when making location choices.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. At stage 4, a; b and p, and the implied distances
Æ
A
= Æ(a; p) and Æ
B
= Æ(b; p) and
^
Æ  minfÆ
A
; Æ
B
g are given. For a given
contribution g
j
of j 6= i, child i's optimization problem is to maximize (4)
subject to (2), (3) and to g
i
 0. Solving this problem yields the reaction
function of child i as
g
i
= maxf0; (Æ
i
)  g
j
g (A1)
for g
j
 0, for i; j 2 fA;Bg and i 6= j, with (Æ
i
) determined by the rst
order condition (6). This proves Lemma 1 and characterizes the stage-4
contribution equilibrium.
^
Æ and condition (6) uniquely determine aggregate
contributions G. By (A1) the child which is located closer to the parents con-
tributes this full amount G and if both children locate at the same distance,
any (g
A
; g
B
) with g
A
+ g
B
= (
^
Æ) and g
A
= (
^
Æ) and g
B
= (1 )(
^
Æ) with
0    1 is an equilibrium. Note that, in this case of indierence, the share
 2 [0; 1] which is contributed by A may be a function (a; b; p) of a; b; and
p. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Before we proceed with the proof, we discuss
and denote three tie-breaking rules. First, A's share (a; b; p) of aggregate
contributions if Æ
A
= Æ
B
at stage 4 has already been discussed in Lemma
1. Two further tie-breaking rules are important at stage 3. Parents have
to choose whether they move (to one of their children) if they are indierent
between moving or not, that is, if minfÆ(a; 0); Æ(b; 0)g = Æ(K). The proba-
bility of moving in case of indierence is denoted 
m
and can generally be a
function 
m
(a; b) of children's locations. If parents move, they move to p = a
or to p = b, because this maximizes the amount of care received. Finally,
also at stage 3, if parents move and if a 6= b they have to choose between a
and b. We denote 
A
and 
B
the conditional probabilities for moving to a or
b, respectively. In general, these probabilities can be functions 
A
(a; b) and
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B
(a; b) of a and b.
We note the following properties:
Property 1: The payo for a child in the equilibrium cannot exceed U
max

u((0)) +m.
To conrm property 1, note that U
max
is obtained by a child if it con-
tributes nothing, and if the other child is located next to the parents and
contributes the whole equilibrium amount (0) that is associated with this
distance. Property 1 implies
Property 2: Any choice a that yields A a payo equal to U
max
in the
subgame equilibrium of stages 2-4 is an equilibrium choice for A.
Property 3: If A chooses some a with Æ(a; 0) 2 (Æ
crit
; Æ(K)), the subgame
perfect equilibrium of stages 2-4 has b = 0; p = 0 and g
B
= (0) = G.
To conrm Property 3, note that p = 0, regardless of b, because Æ(a; 0) <
Æ(K). B's payo is

B
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
u((Æ(b; 0))) +m  (Æ(b; 0))(1 + Æ(b; 0)) if Æ(b; 0) < Æ(a; 0)
u((Æ(b; 0))) +m  (1  )(Æ(b; 0))(1 + Æ(b; 0)) if Æ(b; 0) = Æ(a; 0)
u((Æ(a; 0))) +m if Æ(b; 0) > Æ(a; 0)
(A2)
By Æ(a; 0) > Æ
crit
and the denition of Æ
crit
in (8), this payo has a unique
maximum at b = 0. Hence, A's payo is u((0)) +m = U
max
.
The proof of part (i) proceeds now in steps (I)-(V).
(I) Any a with 0 < Æ(a; 0) < Æ
crit
is not an equilibrium choice. By
properties 2 and 3, a can be an equilibrium location only if it yields payo
U
max
to A, because A can obtain U
max
by locating at some a with Æ(a; 0) 2
(Æ
crit
; Æ(K)): Let Æ(a; 0) < Æ
crit
instead. Parents do not move, given Æ(a; 0) <
Æ(K). Hence, the only location for B that yields U
max
to A is b = 0 if
Æ(a; 0) 2 (0; Æ
crit
), or b = 0 if a = 0 and (0; 0; 0) = 1. However, b = 0 is
suboptimal for B if Æ(a; 0) 2 (0; Æ
crit
), and also if a = 0 and (0; 0; 0) = 1,
as B's payo at b = 0 is equal to u((0)) +m  (0) in these cases, and, by
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Æ(a; 0) < Æ
crit
, this payo is smaller than the payo which B can achieve by,
for instance, a choice of b with Æ(b; 0) > Æ(a; 0).
(II) Properties 2 and 3 imply that all a with Æ(a; 0) 2 (Æ
crit
; Æ(K)) are
equilibrium location choices for A.
(III) A location a with Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
is an equilibrium choice for A, for
instance if  = 0. Parents do not move if Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
< Æ(K), regardless
of B's choice of b. By the denition of Æ
crit
, B is indierent between b =
0 [implying a payo to B equal to u((0)) + m   (0)] and any b with
Æ(b; 0) > Æ(a; 0) [implying a payo to B equal to u((Æ
crit
)) + m], and B
prefers these choices to all other location choices. If B chooses b = 0 given
this indierence, then A receives U
max
, and hence, a with Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
is an
equilibrium location.
(IV) A location a with Æ(a; 0) = Æ(K) is an equilibrium choice for A, for
instance if 
m
= 0, because for this tie-breaking rule the proof of property 3
above extends to Æ(a; 0) = Æ(K).
(V) Finally, (a; b; p) with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K); b = 0 and p = 0 is an equilibrium
location choice if, for instance,  = 0 and 
B
= 1. To see this, note that
B can choose b = 0. Parents do not move in this case, A obtains a payo
equal to U
max
, and B obtains a payo equal to u((0)) + m   (0). Any
other choice b for which parents do not move has a lower payo equal to
u((Æ(b; 0)))+m  (Æ(b; 0))(1+ Æ(b; 0)) for B. A choice b for which parents
move makes them move to b, by 
B
= 1. B will make contributions g
B
= (0)
also in this case and end up with the same payo as for b = 0. Note that
 = 0 is needed to make this (a; b; p) an equilibrium here, because B could
choose b = a, and for a to be optimal for A it is necessary that B then
still bears the full contribution cost. This completes the proof of part (i) in
Proposition 1.
Consider now part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Let 0 <  < 1 and 0 < 
B
< 1. Properties 2 and 3 imply that all (a; b; p)
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with Æ(a; 0) 2 (Æ
crit
; Æ(K)), b = 0 and p = 0 are equilibrium location choices,
as this property was independent of any tie-breaking rule, and that Æ(a; 0) 2
(Æ
crit
; Æ(K)) implies b = 0 and p = 0 in the subgame perfect equilibrium.
We already showed that any a with Æ(a; 0) < Æ
crit
is not an equilibrium
choice even if there is no restriction as regards tie-breaking rules. It remains
to show (I) that a with Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
is an equilibrium location choice and has
b = 0 and p = 0 as unique subgame perfect location choices, (II) that a with
Æ(a; 0) = Æ(K) is an equilibrium location and has b = 0 and p = 0 as unique
subgame perfect location choices, and (III) that all a with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K) are
no longer equilibrium location choices if 0 <  < 1 and 0 < 
B
< 1.
(I) Let Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
< Æ(K): Given such an a and regardless of b, parents
do not move. Hence, A achieves U
max
if and only if b = 0. B's payo as a
function of b is given by (A2). Hence, b = 0 is the unique location choice
that maximizes B's payo for Æ(a; 0) = Æ
crit
if  < 1:
(II) Let Æ(a; 0) = Æ(K). The triples of locations (a; b; p) with Æ(a; 0) =
Æ(K), b = 0 and p = 0 describes an equilibrium of location choices. To see this
we rst note that these locations yield maximum utility U
max
for A (hence, is
optimal for A) and that this choice of a is compatible with p = 0 regardless
of B's location choice. Further, given that parents do not move, B's payo
is again described by (A2) and b = 0 maximizes B's payo (A2) given this
a and anticipated p = 0. Note also that (a; b; p) with Æ(a; 0) = Æ(K) and
b 6= 0 is not an equilibrium if 0 <  < 1 and 
B
< 1. For this combination
of locations to be an equilibrium, it must yield U
max
to A. This requires
that parents must move to B (i.e., p = b) with probability 1 and that B
contributes G = g
B
= (0). However, by 
B
< 1, if parents move, the
probability that they move to b is less than 1 if b 6= a. If b = a, and if parents
move to this location, 0 <  < 1 rules out that B is the sole contributor in
this case. Hence, A's payo would be smaller than U
max
.
(III) We have to show that the restrictions on the tie-breaking rules elimi-
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nate a with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K) as equilibrium locations. Suppose such a location
is an equilibrium location for A. Then the equilibrium must yield U
max
to A,
by property 2. This is the case only if b = 0, or if parents move to B (i.e.,
p = b) with probability 1 and B contributes G = g
B
= (0) with probability
1. However, b = 0 is not an equilibrium choice for B given Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K)
and 0 <  < 1, because, for instance, b = a yields higher payo to B. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show: (I) Any a with Æ(a; 0) < Æ(K) can-
not be an equilibrium location choice for A in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(II) Any a with Æ(a; 0)  Æ(K) can be an equilibrium location choice, and
this equilibrium choice implies b with Æ(b; 0)  Æ(K).
(I) A choice a with Æ(a; 0) < Æ(K) yields payo equal to u((Æ(a; 0)))+m 
(Æ(a; 0))(1 + Æ(a; 0)) in the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium, because
B will maximize its payo for such a's by some b with Æ(b; 0) > Æ(a; 0),
anticipating that parents will choose p = 0 for such a's and A becomes the
sole contributor. For 0 <  < 1 and 0 < 
B
< 1, this payo is lower than
A's payo from any choice a with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K), which yields at least payo
u((0)) +m  (0) to A, for some  with  < 1.
(II) Consider now choices a with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K). B would not choose
some b with Æ(b; 0) < Æ(K). This can be seen as follows. Suppose B chooses
some b with Æ(b; 0) < Æ(K). Parents do not move given b, and B's payo in
this location would be u((Æ(b; 0))) +m  (Æ(b; 0))(1 + Æ(b; 0))  u((0)) +
m   (0). B could achieve at most the right-hand side utility, by choosing
b = 0. However, b = 0 is also suboptimal for B, because any choice with
Æ(b; 0) > Æ(K) yields even higher utility u((0)) + m   (0), with some
(a; b; p) for which  < 1 by 0 <  < 1 and 0 < 
B
< 1.
Finally, any pair (a; b) with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K) and Æ(b; 0) > Æ(K) can be a
pair of equilibrium location choices for appropriate tie-breaking rules. For
instance, if 
B
= 
A
= 1=2 for all such (a; b) with a 6= b; and with   1=2,
B is indierent as to where to locate for all b with Æ(b; 0) > Æ(K) for any
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given choice of a with Æ(a; 0) > Æ(K). Also A's payo is the same for all
choices a with Æ(b; 0) > Æ(K) and does not depend on b's location choice.
Both children have expected equilibrium payo equal to u((0))+m 
1
2
(0).
The proof extends to location choices with Æ(a; 0) = Æ(K) and Æ(b; 0) =
Æ(K), for instance, for 
m
= 1. (Note that 
m
= 1 is compatible with
0 < 
B
< 1, because 
B
is the probability that parents move to b, if they
move.) 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an equilibrium location choice (a; b)
from Proposition 1. For any of these equilibrium choices by a, the optimal
reaction of B and of the parents can establish a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which A receives the maximum possible payo U
max
. This implies that any
of these choices a made by A are also optimal for A if made simultaneously
with B's choice of b. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The outcome in the contribution game in stage
4 is already characterized in the main text. As   is a decreasing function
of
^
Æ, the location decision of parents in stage 3 depends on the minimum
distance minfÆ
A
; Æ
B
g and on the critical distance (K) as dened by (12).
Consider now stage 3. For a given choice Æ
A
< (K) by A, B's payo as
a function of A's and B's location choices and the resulting location choice
p = 0 by parents is
U
B
=
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
u( (Æ
B
)) +m 
1
2
(1 + Æ
B
)( (Æ
B
) + (Æ
B
)); if Æ
B
> Æ
A
u( (Æ
B
)) +m  (1  )(Æ
B
) 
1
2
(1 + Æ
B
)( (Æ
B
)  (Æ
B
));
if Æ
B
= Æ
A
u( (Æ
A
)) +m 
1
2
(1 + Æ
A
)( (Æ
A
)  (Æ
A
)); if Æ
B
< Æ
A
(A3)
The choice Æ
A
= Æ
B
for B is dominated by a slightly larger distance Æ
B
> Æ
A
.
Among all choices Æ
B
< Æ
A
, B prefers Æ
B
= 0 by U
c
(0) = maxfU
c
(Æ)g: All
choices Æ
B
> Æ
A
yield the identical payo u( (Æ
A
)) +m 
1
2
(1 + Æ
A
)( (Æ
A
) 
(Æ
A
)). Accordingly, B chooses Æ
B
= 0 if Æ
A
> 
crit
, B chooses some Æ
B
> Æ
A
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if Æ
A
< 
crit
, and, given the tie-breaking rules, B chooses Æ
B
= 0 or some
Æ
B
> Æ
A
if Æ
A
= 
crit
.
For Æ
A
> (K), and the assumed tie-breaking rules on 
B
and , B's
payo is maximal for some choice Æ
B
> (K), and this yields a positive
probability that the parents move to them, for each of the children. For
Æ
A
= (K), and the tie-breaking rules on 
B
and , the payo-maximizing
choice of B depends on the parents' choice given that they are indierent
between moving or not moving. If we assume that parents do not move
in this case, then B prefers Æ
B
= 0. This will be important for including
Æ
A
= (K) in the set of equilibrium choices.
We turn to stage 1. A's maximum payo among all choices for (a; b; p)
is u( (0)) +m  
1
2
( (0)   (0)). This maximum payo is reached if A can
induce B to choose Æ
B
= 0 and let B make all contributions. Also, for
the tie-breaking rules on 
B
and , this maximum payo is obtained only
if B chooses Æ
B
= 0 and B makes all contributions. To conrm this we
note that u( (Æ
B
)) + m  
1
2
( (Æ
B
)   (Æ
B
))(1 + Æ
B
) is the utility that A
obtains if Æ
A
> Æ
B
, that this utility is strictly decreasing in Æ (which can
be shown by using u
00
(G) < 0, 2u
0
( ) = 1 + Æ, u
0
() = 1 + Æ; and the
total dierentials of these conditions). Further, A's utility is strictly lower
if Æ
A
 Æ
B
. Note that the corners of the interval [
crit
;(K)] are also
possible equilibrium choices for A, because (Æ(a; 0); Æ(b; 0); p) = (
crit
; 0; 0)
and (Æ(a; 0); Æ(b; 0); p) = ((K); 0; 0) are also equilibria. To support the left
corner of the interval as an equilibrium, we need to assume that B chooses 0
with certainty if B is indierent between staying or moving, and to support
the right corner of the interval, we need to assume that parents do not move
if they are indierent between moving or not moving. Finally, we note that
any other choice a does not (or not with probability 1) lead to Æ
B
= 0 and
p = 0. Hence, A would not achieve the maximum payo. 
34
9 References
Altonji, Joseph G., Fumio Hayashi and Laurence Kotliko, 1995, Parental
altruism and inter vivos transfers: theory and evidence, NBER working paper
no. 5378.
Altonji, Joseph G., Fumio Hayashi and Laurence Kotliko, 1996, The
eects of income and wealth on time and money transfers between parents
and children, NBER working paper no. 5522.
Andreoni, James, 1989, Giving with impure altruism: applications to
charity and Ricardian Equivalence, Journal of Political Economy, 97(6), 1447-
58.
Andreoni, James, 1990, Impure altruism and donations to public goods:
a theory of warm-glow giving? Economic Journal, 100(June, 401), 464-77.
Bengtson, Vern L., and Joseph A. Kuypers (1971), Generational dier-
ence and the developmental stake, Aging and Human Development, 2, 249-
260.
Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1989, Love and spaghetti, the opportunity cost
of virtue, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 165-173.
Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1993, A survey of theories of the family, Center
for Research on Economic and Social Theory and Department of Economics
Working Paper Series, 93-02, University of Michigan.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, 1985,
The strategic bequest motive, Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1045-1076.
Couch, Kenneth A., Mary C. Daly and Douglas A. Wolf, 1999, Time?
Money? The allocation of resources to older parents, Demography, 36(2),
219-232.
Cox, Donald, and Mark R. Rank, 1992, Inter-vivos transfers and inter-
generational exchange, Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(2), 305-314.
Dwyer, Jerey W., and Raymond T. Coward, 1991, A multivariate com-
35
parison of the involvement of adult sons versus daughters in the care of
impaired parents, Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 46, S259-69.
Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Paul M. De Graaf, and Donald J. Treiman,
1992, A standard international socio-economic index of occupational status,
Social Science Research, 21(1), 1-56.
Gouldner, Alvin W., 1960, The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary state-
ment, American Sociological Review, 25(2), 161-178.
Greenwood, Michael J., 1997, Internal migration in developed countries,
in: Mark R. Rosenzweig and Oded Stark (eds.), Handbook of Population
and Family Economics, vol. 1B, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 647-720.
Groot, Wim, and Maartje Verberne, 1997, Aging, job mobility, and com-
pensation, Oxford Economic Papers, 49(3), 380-403.
Kohli, Martin, and Harald Kunemund (eds.), 2000, Die zweite Lebenshalf-
te - Gesellschaftliche Lage und Partizipation. Ergebnisse des Alters-Survey,
Leske und Budrich, Opladen.
Kohli, Martin, Harald Kunemund, Andreas Motel and Marc Szydlik,
2000, Families apart? Intergenerational transfers in East and West Germany.
In: Arber, Sara Attias-Donfut and Claudine Attias-Donfut (eds.), The Myth
of Generational Conict: The Family and State in Ageing Societies. London:
Routledge, 88-99.
Konrad, Kai A., and Kjell Erik Lommerud, 1995, Family policy with non-
cooperative families, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(4), 581-601.
Konrad, Kai A., and Kjell Erik Lommerud, 2000, The bargaining family
revisited, Canadian Journal of Economics, 33(2), 471-487.
Kotliko, Laurence J., 1992, Economic exchange and support within U.S.
families, NBER working paper no. 4080.
Kotliko, Laurence J. and John N. Morris, 1989, How much care do the
aged receive from their children? A bimodal picture of contact and assistance,
in: David A. Wise (ed.), The Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of
36
Chicago Press, pp. 151-175.
Koyano, Wataru, Michio Hashimoto, Tetsua Fukawa, Hiroshi Shibato and
Atsuaki Gunji, 1994, The social support system of the Japanese elderly,
Journal of Cross-cultural Gerontology, 9(3), 323-333.
Kunemund, Harald, and Martin Rein, 1999, There is more to receiving
than needing: theoretical arguments and empirical explorations of crowding
in and crowding out, Ageing and Society, 19, 93-121.
Lundberg, Shelly, and Robert Pollak, 1993, Separate spheres bargaining
and the marriage market, Journal of Political Economy 101(6), 988-1010.
Marks, Nadine F., 1996, Caregiving across the lifespan: national preva-
lence and predictors, Family Relations, 45(1), 27-36.
Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994, Modeling rent seeking contests, European Journal
of Political Economy, 10(1), 41-60.
Soldo, Beth J., and Martha S. Hill, 1993, Intergenerational transfers: eco-
nomic, demographic, and social preferences, Annual Review of Gerontology
and Geriatrics, 13, 187-216.
Topel, Robert H., 1991, Specic capital, mobility, and wages: wages rise
with job seniority, Journal of Political Economy, 99(1), 145-176.
Wolf, Douglas A., 1994, The elderly and their kin: patterns of availability
and access, in: Linda G. Martin and Samuel H. Preston (eds.), Demography
of Aging, National Academy Press, Washington D.C., pp. 146-194.
37
